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Problematising public sector performance:  
The benefits of a “flesh and blood” approach 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose – This paper introduces a novel theoretical approach to conceptualising performance in 
government departments, with wider applicability to other parts of government. 
Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on identified gaps in notions of performance in the 
accounting literature and interview data from three New Zealand central government 
departments, the paper introduces Alexander’s (2003, 2006, 2011) theory of performance.  This 
theory has the potential to enhance conceptualisations of performance and enrich research on 
performance management systems. 
Findings –By introducing a performative theory, which differs from previously used Latourian 
performative theory, this paper highlights new avenues for research into performance 
management.  It illustrates the application of Alexander’s theory of performance via an 
examination of how public servants construct the “flesh and blood” (Alexander, 2006, p. 33) of 
their performance in the absence of visible and tangible measures such as profit, and how they 
create sufficient unity around the notion of performance to direct their efforts towards achieving 
performance expectations.  
Research limitations/implications – The findings presented here may not be as applicable 
beyond these case studies. Nevertheless, the issues discussed in this paper are recognisable in 
other accounting research. 
Originality/value – Extant public sector literature tends to focus on either a production model 
or a service delivery model of performance, with some notable exceptions.  This paper offers 
scholars the opportunity to rethink the notion of public sector performance through a new 
approach.  It illustrates how this may be done and identifies possible new research avenues. 
 
Keywords - performance management; public sector; Alexander; performative theory; case 
studies; New Zealand 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper explores the possibilities for studying the nexus between performativity and 
performance management systems.  In doing so, it connects with the accounting literature that 
has advocated for more use of performative theories in accounting research (e.g. Boedker, 2010) 
and highlighted that the concept of ‘performance’ has been overlooked in much public sector 
performance management and measurement research (e.g. Johnsen and Vakkuri, 2006).  We use 
a novel performative approach, from outside the Actor-Network Theory family (Latour, 2005), 
to problematise and reconceptualise the notion of performance, illustrating its utility via an 
examination of the performance management systems (PMS) in three public sector organisations.  
We argue that by introducing a theory that makes ‘performance’ the subject of study, we can 
respond better to calls for an improved understanding of both the “public” character of public 
sector performance (Pollitt, 1986) and the “inherently inter-subjective aspects associated with 
different actors’ interpretations” of performance, stability and change (Brignall & Modell, 2000, 
p. 300; see also Modell, 2005).  We also respond to Pallot’s (1999) challenge to “reinvent” ways 
of thinking about accounting through public sector experiences and Van Helden’s (2005, p. 114) 
recommendation for accounting research to be fully cognizant of “what is really going on in the 
public sector” in order to remain relevant to public sector debates.   
 
To do this, we introduce Alexander’s (2003, 2006, 2011) theory of performance as a lens for 
examining how three public sector organisations have developed and implemented unified 
notions of performance in conjunction with their audiences.  Furthermore, we investigate how 
these collective understandings are used by groups to stay sufficiently engaged in public service 
‘performance’ work to overcome both instrumental (rational) and institutional barriers to 
change/improvement in PMS.  We use a broad definition of PMS, guided by our interviewees’ 
inclusion of more than measurement in their understandings of what public sector entities need 
to consider as ‘performance’ information (this will be elaborated further in the findings section), 
building on, but differing from, Broadbent and Laughlin’s distinction between relationship-
based PMS and transactional PMS.  In this context, we acknowledge Van Dooren, Bouchkaert 
& Halligan’s (2010) view that “performance management has accumulated many meanings”.  
These “many meanings” are evident in the following snapshot of what researchers in this field 
have described as the main features of performance management:  
4 
 
 
 Something wider than just performance measurement (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2009; 
Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008);  
 a system of identifying organisational goals and developing systems to monitor and measure 
those goals (Pollitt, 1986; Thomas, 2006) 
 organisational performance and not merely individual performance (Herbert, 2008); 
 more than a list of techniques; it also needs to take a “strategic orientation to the generation, 
interpretation and analysis of … information” (Langfield-Smith, 2008, p. 206). 
 
According to Thomas (2006), these features of performance information and its accompanying 
systems of measurement need to be combined in the decision making process, with the aim of 
continuously improving an organisation’s performance.  Combining these ideas means that 
performance management is not only a way to collect information to enhance decision making, 
but is also a value judgement about that information.  It is a value judgement about both the 
quality of the actions performed by an organisation and the quality of the organisation’s 
achievements (Van Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2010).  Introducing Alexander’s (2003, 2006, 
2011) theory, which reconceptualises how to understand what constitutes performance 
achievement, will complement the existing focus on the design, use and impact of PMS and 
research on legitimacy-seeking behaviour (van Helden, Johnsen and Vakkuri, 2008).  
Alexander’s theory opens new insights into how people orchestrate (enough) unity to achieve 
performance expectations.   
 
Structure of the paper 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  First, we identify common 
conceptualisations of performance in the accounting literature. Then, we consider how 
performance has been conceptualised outside the ‘market’ model, and outside the 
accounting/economics disciplines.  We do this to show how wide the concept can be, and  also 
to highlight the conflation of many performance ideas in accounting into the current narrow 
focus on elements such as efficiency or even wider conceptualisations of impact or outcome 
performance (Humphrey and Miller, 2012).  This is done to shift the institutional barriers that 
focus on performance in terms of markets.  The purpose, while seeming like a detour from the 
topic of PMS, will be to provide alternative conceptualisations for ‘performance’ in public 
sector accounting research and highlight the benefits of doing so.  Next, based on these 
alternative understandings of performance and the roles of performance in society, we introduce 
5 
 
Alexander’s theory of performance. Following that, we outline the methodology and method 
used to collect the empirical evidence we draw on to illustrate how Alexander’s theory can be 
applied to accounting-based studies of public sector performance.  While our case studies are 
drawn from government departments because these sites put in clear relief the ideas inherent in 
Alexander’s theory, the insights are potentially applicable across both entities in public 
ownership and public services more generally regardless of ownership model (Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 2008).  Finally, we outline how Alexander’s theory sheds light on findings in our data 
that were not easily explained by existing PMS theory or research.   
 
 
‘PERFORMANCE’: HOW HAS IT BEEN CONCEPTUALISED? 
 
The word ‘performance’ is ubiquitous.  Google it, and you get 2,740,000,000 hits.  One entry 
advises us of a performance enhancing drug; another sells us performance shoes. We can find 
“sports performance” clips on YouTube alongside a site promoting an academic conference 
entitled “Can performance save the world?” (www.performingtheworld.org). And the list goes 
on.  From this array of scholarly research, advertising and advocacy, it is clear that the term 
‘performance’ can be used in just about any context. Yet to date, public sector accounting 
literature has mostly focused on initiatives originating in the finance section of an entity (van 
Helden, 2005) resulting in relatively narrow conceptualisations of performance. 
 
Conceptualisations of public sector performance in accounting journals 
Our literature review of accounting articles containing the words “public sector” and 
“performance” in the abstract 1  revealed three broad conceptualisations of the performance 
model and a set of key words associated with describing performance.  These articles tend to 
conceptualise performance in three ways, with only a few articles explicitly defining their model 
of performance.  Below, we discuss the dominant two conceptions first, and the fledgling third 
approach after that. 
                                                   
1
 The selection of accounting journals for review builds on Modell (2009) in attempt to build a body of knowledge 
rather than an incompatible comparison set.  Modell (2009) identified the journals most likely to publish public 
sector performance management research as being: Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, Financial Accountability and Management and Management Accounting Research.  In 
addition, we used the bibliographies of these articles to supplement this journal list as necessary; this included a 
review of relevant papers appearing in Critical Perspectives on Accounting.   
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Within the literature review, one way of conceptualising performance that was first identified by 
Pollitt (1986) is now known as the production model of performance (Van Dooren, Bouckaert & 
Halligan, 2010, p. 17-22).  It is a model that describes the transformation of inputs into outputs 
and ultimately outcomes.  It is conceptualised around production processes and has formed the 
explicit basis of several government PMSs (New Zealand Treasury, 2004; HM [UK] Treasury, 
1997; New Zealand Office of the Auditor General, 2008).  
 
The second conceptualisation recognises that the production of goods is not the norm in public 
services and that public ownership is no longer the dominant mode of service delivery. Hence a 
variety of conceptions of ‘performance’ circulate.  Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) identify this 
shift in the accounting literature away from defining the public sector in terms of ownership and 
towards focusing on a public service model that examines the universal provision of services, 
regardless of the ownership or delivery model.  Within our literature review, two articles 
explicitly considered this service-based model of performance and its consequences for PMS.  
Hyndman and Anderson (1997) examined service delivery to the public and Williams, 
MacIntosh and Moore, (1990) explored how service delivery within public service is often the 
coordination of multiple services for the needs of the individual.  While few other articles 
explicitly outlined their chosen definition of performance, which highlights how taken for 
granted the concept of performance is, the production and service models appeared to dominate 
the accounting literature we reviewed.  For example, the following range of performance related 
words and concepts associated with the two models appeared:  
• Quality (Johansson and Siverbo, 2009, Yamamoto, 2004) and quantity (Tooley, et al, 
2010, Verbeeten, 2008, Thompson, 2001; Lee, 2008, Mensah, 2009),  
• Goal orientation (Yamamoto, 2004, Ogden, 1995, Hyndman and Eden, 2000, Demirag, 
2012, Seal, 2003, Modell, 2009 & 2012, Chang, 2009.) 
• Probity, (Tooley, et al, 2010), accuracy (Verbeeten, 2008), productivity (Johansson and 
Siverbo, 2009, Hoque, Arends and Alexander, 2004), and cost (Newberry and Barnett, 
2001 and Tooley et al, 2010), 
• Innovation and morale (Verbeeten, 2008) 
• Efficiency and/or effectiveness (Mayston, 1985 & 1992, Ogden, 1995, Tomkins & Green, 
1988, Newberry, 2001, Verbeeten, 2008, Hyndman & Eden, 2000, Johansson & Siverbo, 
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2009, Glynn, 1986, Hyndman & Connolly, 2011; Hoque & Adams, 2011, Rutherford, 
2000, Sola & Prior 2001, Lee, 2008, Samkin & Schneider, 2010, Tooley, Hooks & 
Basnan, 2010, Seal, 2003, Siverbo & Johansson, 2006, ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012, Carlin, 
2004) 
• Output control and “intangible elements” (Catasus & Gronlund, 2005; and Cugansen, 
Boedker & Guthrie, 2007). 
• Financial ratios, including return on investment, as expressions of financial performance 
(Jacobs, 2009, Ogden, 1995, Pilcher, 2010, Stanley, Jennings and Mack, 2008, Perez and 
Robson, 1999, Cohen, 2008, Cugansen & Lacey, 2011)   
• Economy (Mayston, 1985, McCulloch and Ball, 1992, Sola et al, 2001, Seal, 2003, 
Woods and Grubric, 2008) and 
• Efficacy and equity (Sola, 2001, Seal, 2003, Johnsen, 2006, Kloot & Martin 2000). 
   
This ‘mix and match’ approach between the words associated with the service and production 
models of performance in the academic literature suggests a wide diversity of ‘institutional 
logics’ regarding what counts as performance, rather than narrow definitions associated with 
either professional groups or managerialist philosophy as much institutional research suggests 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000).  Nevertheless, the limited focus of these two  conceptualisations of 
performance points to the unnecessary narrowing of options in conceptualising performance in 
public sector research.  Institutional theory is useful in highlighting how institutional pressures 
have probably contributed to this narrow focus (Modell, Jacobs and Wiesel, 2007).  That is, 
these two options of production or service are bounded by the institutional limits of ‘market’ 
views of performance.  A market, by definition, is “a group of buyers and sellers of a particular 
good or service” (Mankiw, 2009, p. 66).   According to this definition, performance is 
embedded only in transactions of goods or services.  Hence, institutionalism is useful for 
revealing the dominance of production and service delivery models in conceptualisations of 
performance in public sector accounting research.  It also reveals the unintended impact of the 
private sector foundations of the New Public Management (Hood, 1995) reforms on public 
sector research and practice.  Institutional theory, however, is not as useful in taking this 
revelation further. So, as Modell (2009, 2012) notes, other theoretical perspectives are needed to 
lead research forward.  Alternative conceptualisations of performance are needed for accounting 
research to address the issue of public sector ‘public-ness’ (Pollitt, 1986; Pallot, 1999; Catasus 
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& Gronlund, 2005).  As Brignall and Modell (2000) highlight, future studies of public sector 
PMS might consider the “inherently inter-subjective aspects associated with different actors’ 
interpretations” and, as Jeppesen (2006) adds, the “ambiguous knowledge base” of assessing 
public sector performance.    
 
Taking up this challenge to consider more ‘subjective’ notions of performance and their 
consequences, a small but growing number of papers present a third way of exploring 
performance.  These articles explore the ‘judgemental’ elements of PMS, especially in 
circumstances where transformation from “subjective assessments into compliance checks 
against generally acknowledged criteria” is not possible (Jeppesen, 2012, p. 235, see also, 
Brignall & Modell, 2000, Modell, 2005, ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012).  In addition, some scholars 
have also suggested that multiple conceptualisations of PMS exist, including distinguishing 
between relationship and transaction-based PMS (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009).  Contributing 
to this area of research we argue that the dominant, market-based conceptualisation of 
performance is funnelling accounting research in a particular direction, so it may be helpful to 
introduce a theory from outside accounting and market-based notions of performance to widen 
the debate around PMS.   
 
‘PERFORMANCE’: BEYOND ECONOMICS AND ACCOUNTING 
 
Turning first to a dictionary definition of performance, there are two types of ‘performance’. 
Before problematising the distinction between them, we focus on the possibilities that these two 
ways of understanding performance open up for the study of public sector PMS. 
 
The first distinct way the word performance is used relates to the performance of a task.  The 
Oxford dictionary (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/performance) defines it as “the 
capabilities of a machine, product, or vehicle”.  That is, performance is “the action or process of 
performing a task or function” or “a task or operation seen in terms of how successfully it is 
performed”.  The sentence the dictionary uses to contextualise the definition is “the continual 
performance of a single task reduces a man to the level of a machine”.  This kind of language 
and conceptualisation of performance is seen throughout the accounting literature review 
outlined above.  For example, performance is discussed in terms of the need for public servants 
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to “accomplish their tasks” (Williams, MacIntosh and Moore, 1990, p. 223).  Earl and Hopwood 
(1980, p. 10) state “we do not seek to question the necessity for rationalisation machines … [to] 
… create rationale for action”.  Moreover, Czarniawska-Joreges and Jacobsson (1989, p. 29) 
specifically invoke the “machine metaphor” in their work on budgeting as a symbolic 
performance.   
 
Czarniawska-Joreges and Jacobsson’s (1989)  combination of the machine metaphor with 
symbolic performance brings us to the second way the word performance can be used.  That is, 
to describe an artistic, theatre or live ‘performance’ of some sort.  The Oxford Dictionary notes 
‘performance’ in this sense is “an act of presenting a play, concert, or other form of 
entertainment; act of performing a dramatic role, song, or piece of music” 
(http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/performance).  That is, the mention of the word 
entertainment means that plays or concerts can be characterised as ‘make believe’.  Over time, 
assumptions regarding the nature of ‘entertainment’ performances have changed.  For example, 
the assumption of a contained spatial area (such as a stage) is no longer required (Loxley, 2007, 
p. 5).  Also, the position and attitude of the audience as external to the performance has been 
challenged (Loxley, 2007, p. 149).  Nevertheless, the sense of performance being fictional or 
‘non-serious’ in nature, as Austin (1955) puts it, remains relatively intact.  Indeed, it is this idea 
of ‘non-seriousness’ that allows performance art to provide its critiques of society, values or 
people, even in more regulated or censored societies.  This suspicion of a gap between fiction 
and serious matters, or rhetoric and reality, is clear in accounting research.  For example, 
Christensen and Skaebaek (2007), using Goffman as a base, note that performance management 
reporting might be “false representations of reality”.  From another perspective, Chang (2009, p. 
145) claims that this misleading slant is for the purposes of “impression management” to gain a 
“favourable image”.  Samkin and Schneider (2010, p. 257) go further, arguing that their case 
entity uses its reporting accountabilities to ensure its own “self-preservation as much as to 
achieve its public benefit purpose”.   
 
Recognising the possibility of separation between rhetoric and reality has lead to a productive 
research stream on the use of accounting for legitimising purposes rather than performance 
improvement.  Indeed authors such as Power (1996, 1997, 2003) have noted that such 
legitimating aims may actually subvert (task accomplishment and machine-like) performance.  
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However, this approach does not recognise that performance combines symbolic2 and material 
culture and may require both symbolic and material understandings to facilitate improved task 
accomplishment in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty. Hence, the concept of public sector 
performance in academic accounting research, despite often being conceptualised as a linear 
production or service delivery model, conflates tacit understandings of both machine-like and 
stage-like performance notions. 
 
What are the implications of this conflation of machine-like performance with non-serious 
performances, when it is applied to the serious matter of ‘accounting’ or ‘government’?  Prior 
research on performance management has generally focused (when it is explicit) on the use of 
the word performance that associates human performance with the machine.  Hence, 
‘performance’ is the efficient functioning of human (and other) resources in the achievement of 
pre-set goals, as explored by Pollitt (1986) and Hyndman and Anderson (1997), among others.  
This conflation of the human task with the functioning of the machine is made possible by 
previous modern thinkers who have already established this link.  For example, Descartes 
declared “the living body is not fundamentally different from the lifeless, it is a kind of animated 
corpse, a functioning mechanism” (Leder, 1998, p. 119).  Equally, contemporary performance 
management texts hold the machine out as the ‘ideal’.  For example, Merchant and Van der 
Stede (2007, p. 12) claim automation is a solution to management control problems since 
machines, such as robots, are more consistent, more accurate and do not suffer from 
motivational lapses.  Even the cover is of the Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) text book 
reinforces this view of performance – the cover is a mass of train tracks.  The overall effect is 
disjointed and chaotic, but each and every track is set with a finite destination and way to travel, 
all heading toward a distant station. In this management control-orientated view, performance 
management systems are designed to get the human resources of an organisation to perform like 
a machine in the fixed grooves of a railway. But, is that what is wanted from public services? 
 
In the non-serious (i.e. fictional) but deliberate critique of this machine/human performance 
conflation, Kafka (1919) writes of aman being written on by a machine that enfolds his body 
                                                   
2
 Symbolic processes include all aspects of communication, such as verbal and written language, emotions and 
gestures at the individual level, and cultural values and political power at the organisational level. Symbolic 
processes convey significance and meaning to interactions and conversations (Garner, 2010, p. 348).   
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into an enormous typewriter-like machine that repeatedly marks language on and into his body, 
until eventually he dies.  This machine, which is only capable of repeating and marking the 
same message into his (now) broken body, draws on serious critique of the analogy that people 
are (or can become) machines.  Loxley (2007) argues that in the context of both Kafka’s (1919) 
short story and the everyday performances of people becoming what their management control 
systems (such as PMS) want, the distinctions between serious machine-like performance and 
non-serious stage performance becomes blurred.   
 
Problematising the clear cut distinction between performances as non-serious and performance 
as task completion opens new possibilities for seeing both types of performance in a new light 
and reconceptualising the public character of public sector performance (Pollitt, 1986).  As 
Boedker (2010) highlights, the foundation of many performance theories is the use of Austin 
(1955) by Goffman (1959).  Goffman emphasised that while people were not consciously 
“acting”, social positions required “something like role-playing” in order for a person to be 
recognised in that role (quoted in Loxley, 2007, p. 151).  In this sense, Goffman argues “life 
itself is … enacted” (Goffman, 1959, p.72).  Goffman’s point is that “all the world is not, of 
course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn’t are not easy to specify” (Goffman, 1959, p. 
72).  Butler takes these ideas forward. Drawing also on ideas from Derrida, Foucault and others 
in looking at gender, she argues that gender is not given; it is a process of becoming, a constant 
performance (Butler, 1993).  While Butler (1993) and Latour (2005) each focus on the need for 
‘enactment’ to occur before action can be observed, Butler’s (1993) work on gender also 
highlights the role of audiences in the process of creating each enactment.  She argues that 
successful performances of gender are when the audience (and ultimately the actor) perceives 
the person’s gender, sex and essential identity to be identical – that is, that the person is female 
rather than enacting femininity or female-ness.   
 
Using drag shows as an example, Butler (1993) highlights disruptions to this conflation of 
performance and essence.  While each individual may disrupt their own gender performance and, 
indeed, needs to reaffirm their performance throughout their life, drag shows challenge the 
external conflation of sexual organs with gender identity to all that view the performance.  In 
examining the processes of the drag show Butler (1993) also unearths an important distinction 
between performance on a stage and performance in everyday life.  She reveals that the 
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disruption or challenge that any performance offers to perceived notions of what should be 
performed are safer when enacted on stage.  She argues that “nothing that happens [on the stage] 
need have any consequences for real life” (quoted in Loxley, 2007, p. 142).  This does not mean 
that there might not be consequences – those actors and writers who lost their heads because 
totalitarian regimes disagreed with their ‘performances’ are, indeed, to use Austin’s (1955) 
phrase “serious” matters.  However, people can choose to perceive performances and their 
consequences differently if they are initiated on the stage.  On stage they can be ignored and 
dismissed as ‘entertainment’.  The challenge for a ‘drag performer’ when one appears in 
everyday life, Butler argues, is completely different.  These performances disrupt not merely 
specific events, such as the transsexual’s right to use the bathroom (Daily Mail, 2012); they are 
also a disruption to all enactments of gender, which challenges the fundamental assumption of a 
fixed concept of ‘reality’ and therefore a fixed concept of what is being performed.   
 
All this theoretical discussion and focus on gender expectations seems a far cry from PMS in the 
public sector.  Yet, what a performative approach like Butler’s (1993) accomplishes is to 
channel analysis toward reconceptualising public sector performance as a constant process of 
becoming.  This perspective highlights contingency and fluidity which challenges modern ideals 
where the fixed output of the machine is held up as the performance goal.    If performance is a 
process of becoming, then it needs constant enactment with audiences to be (re)affirmed.  The 
implication of this perspective for public sector performance management is that ‘performance’ 
cannot be seen as the singular delivery of a good or service.  Performance must be seen as a 
constant process of enacting the unifying expectations of the audience.  As a result, PMS cannot 
only focus on tangible measures such as profit or even quantity and quality measures, let alone 
qualitative evaluations of service delivery.  To be seen as ‘performing’, public entities must be 
seen to be naturally fulfilling a predetermined expectation, equivalent to the gendered 
expectation of what a woman is, and how she will behave.  While Butler’s work is significant in 
highlighting the idea of the ‘process of becoming’ for performative studies of contemporary 
society, her work, as McKinlay (2010 p. 240) notes, is “highly abstract” and difficult to apply to 
“empirical accounting” work (for an exception see Roberts’ [2005; 2009] use of Butler).  Hence, 
the advantage of using Alexander’s (2003; 2006; 2011) theory (which builds on Butler and 
others) is that he has created a way to use these performative ideas in a framework for analysing 
empirical situations.   
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ALEXANDER’S THEORY OF PERFORMANCE 
 
Alexander’s (2003; 2006; 2011) theory assists in reconceptualising performance and hence 
understanding not only how PMS are designed and used for rational decision making (van 
Helden, Johnsen & Vakkuri, 2008) but also how they are used to achieve the entity’s 
performance expectations.  Alexander (1982) was first introduced to accounting research by 
Ezzamel (2009) who used Alexander’s (1982) work on the significance of Hobbes to modern 
thought.  Yet Alexander’s (2003; 2006; 2011) own theoretical work, developed as a Professor of 
Sociology at Yale, has received limited attention in accounting research.  This may stem from 
the accounting discipline’s narrow understanding of the word ‘ritual’, which was included in the 
title of one of his early chapters on his theory, Social performance between ritual and strategy 
(2006).  Alexander (2006) does not use the word ritual in the pejorative sense.  He does not 
associate it with ‘hollow form’ or meaningless compliance, as it is often the case in the 
accounting literature (e.g., Czarniawska-Jorges and Jacobsson, 1989; Power, 1997).   Rather, 
drawing on anthropological understandings of the term, he uses ritual to indicate the “repeated 
and simplified cultural communication” of symbols and processes people use to create group 
unity and action in the face of ambiguity or conflict (Alexander, 2006, p. 29).  In his notion of 
social performance, he argues that human beings cannot separate their instrumental and 
emotional responses, hence he advocates for the study of both at the same time.  He outlines 
how the success of a social performance results in ritual-like effects.  That is, if the performance 
is perceived as authentic then a process of reconciling differences can begin.  And, having 
established the authenticity of the performance, audience and performers begin a process of 
“cultural extension” and “psychological identification” (Alexander, 2011, p. 83-85).  These 
terms are used to describe the process whereby performers make audiences feel the performance 
is “natural” and “taken for granted,” or as if there can never be a “counter” or alternative 
performance (Alexander, 2006, p. 77).  These terms also convey the process whereby audiences 
support performers in their endeavours. 
 
During this process of symbolic and instrumental communication, audience identification is 
intensified and, if the performance is successful, the audience comes to accept its “prescriptive 
and descriptive validity” (Alexander, 2006, p. 29).  In other words, they accept the normative 
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implication of the performance, if not for themselves, at the very least for the performers or ‘the 
public’, however the individual defines ‘the public’.  This theory makes visible the human need 
to not only give meaning and emotional weight to instrumental action, but also to believe in the 
authenticity and validity of the performance.  Otherwise, as Christensen and Skaebaek (2007, p. 
120) note, activities are fulfilled (if done at all) with “little passion”. We argue that it is this 
passion, or as Alexander (2006, p. 29) calls it (at the group level) “cultural extension” and 
“psychological identification”, that enables humans (collectively) to persevere through 
institutional and other barriers to change.   
 
Key to Alexander’s theory is the idea that, in highly fragmented societies, ideas and practices 
need to be made “flesh and blood” (Alexander, 2006, p. 33) if they are to affect audiences. In 
other words, if ideas and intensions are to motivate change, they need to be ‘made real’ through 
enactment – there is not a ‘reality’ that is independent of the belief in the shared enactment.  
This shared belief and enactment of “flesh and blood” gives the ritual its efficiency and 
effectiveness in providing transference of the meaning, “comfort” (Pentland, 1993, p. 605), 
identity, and sense of belonging (Alexander, 2006, p. 29) that enable and empower actions of 
change.  This enactment in flesh and blood is necessary because Alexander (2006, p. 30) 
believes that people “frequently do not accept the validity of one another’s intentions and often 
disagree even about the descriptions that people offer for acts”.  In this sense, Alexander (2006, 
p. 29) argues, most performances are a “failure” – that is, they fail to persuade audiences to 
share a “mutual belief in the descriptive and prescriptive validity ... and ... authenticity of one 
another’s intentions”.  He takes failure as the norm in fragmented societies – and here his ideas 
echo Kurunmaki and Miller’s (2006) description of government as a “congenital failure”.  As a 
result, studies that focus on de-coupling or performance failure are not, in Alexander’s view, 
going to provide the interesting insights into social change and social stability.   To explain acts 
of success (energising and unifying the group) and failure (being perceived as false), Alexander 
(2006, p. 32) argues that “to be effective in a society of increasing complexity, social 
performances must engage in a project of re-fusion”.  His interest, therefore, unlike many 
institutional studies, is not focused on failure or decoupling or even tightly coupled research 
sites. Rather, he is interested in processes that “re-fuse” fragmented audiences (Alexander, 2006, 
p. 34-35). As a result, Alexander’s theory is useful for examining how public servants unify not 
15 
 
only internal stakeholders, such as staff, around concepts of performance, but also external 
stakeholders – any ‘audience’ to their work/performance.    
 
Alexander (2006) encourages researchers to explore the elements that are being used to 
(successfully) re-fuse society (or groups within societies).  To use this theory in analysis, 
Alexander unpacks the structural, cultural and emotional elements of social performance.  
Alexander (2011) has six elements in his concept of a social performance.  Several of these 
individual elements have already been used in accounting research that uses a performative 
frame (e.g., Boedker, 2010; Skaebaek & Thorbjornsen, 2007).  However, Alexander’s (2011, p. 
147) contribution is not the identification of the elements, but the focus on how the entire 
performance - and any counter-performances - have the effect of unifying audiences to accept, 
or at least allow, the performers to achieve their ends.  His interest is not the permissiveness of 
the audience itself, but how the performance persuades (or does not persuade) the audience of 
the “prescriptive and descriptive validity” of the entity (Alexander, 2006, p. 29).  In other words, 
he explores how the ‘naturalness’ of a performance is achieved.  Once audiences perceive the 
performance as natural, as having no (reasonable) alternative, they will also accept the entity’s 
descriptions of its own performance, because there is no alternative. 
 
These six elements of social performance are (Alexander, 2011, p. 83-84): 
• Actor:  Those people, groups or organisations, which are involved in a performance with 
some form of intent.  They can be “lifelike or wooden, imaginative or dull” (Alexander, 
2011, p. 83), but nevertheless they try to convince others of the significance of their 
performance.  In terms of this research, the primary focus is actors within organisations 
and then their collective performances as organisations.  That is, the three government 
departments.   
• Collective Representations: Alexander (2006) uses Durkheim’s ([1895]1938) term, 
‘collective representations’, to describe the societal ideas and practices that have become 
so compressed that the socio-political beliefs in the collective representation come to 
symbolise society’s broader ideas and moral systems. Examples of collective 
representations can include laws, conventions, societal expectations [such as gender 
expectations] and parables (Morrison, 1995, p.154). Collective representations do not 
always reflect any particular individual’s personal experience, but they live as 
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“independent forms having different characteristics and sensibilities” (Morrison, 1995, 
p.154).  This means a person does not need to experience the connection between the 
collective representation and the moral system or idea it implies in order to believe the 
collective representation to be “real” enough to act on (Morrison, 1995, p.154). 
Accounting research on different kinds of collective representations include: Seal’s 
(2003) study of the role of the idea of modernity in facilitating change; Czarniswka-
Joerges and Jacobssom’s (1989) consideration of ‘Swedish’ cultural values and Western 
‘rationalism’; and Johnsen and Vakkuri’s (2006) debate as to the existence of a ‘Nordic’ 
model.   In the case of this paper, the belief that people know what ‘New Public 
Management’ is, and that it will make public sector performance better, can also be seen 
as a collective representation.   
• Means of symbolic production: This is the material means through which actors 
communicate their performance.  This is the stage and props, in which ever way they are 
created.  In the case of most government departments, the stage is created (and 
monopolised) by politicians. But, nevertheless, departments still have access to media, 
coercive powers to influence the action of other entities and individuals (laws), and 
monetary resources to pay for the time of staff, contractors and resources to hire spaces, 
make public notices, create websites and other ways of producing meaning.  Means of 
symbolic production might take the form of an advertising campaign, or be as simple as 
a press release. 
• Mise-en-scene: This is the role attributed to the director, the intentional “putting into the 
scene” of a particular performance (Alexander, 2011, p. 84).  This is similar to the 
concept of “framing” used in accounting research (see for example Christensen and 
Skaebaek, 2007 or Fallan, Pettersen and Stemsrudhgen, 2010).  However, Alexander’s 
contribution to this notion adds to Callan’s perspective that “an audience’s interpretation 
of a reaction to a person, event or discourse can be shaped by the frame in which that 
information is viewed” (quoted in Fallan, Pettersen and Stemsrudhgen, 2010, p. 190). 
Alexander (2011, p. 84) notes that the director puts the actors’ “movements in time and 
space” and that this is part of making a performance “flesh and blood”.  In our paper, the 
choices made by a government department’s Chief Executive about strategic direction 
and how it is actualised can be seen in terms of the mise-en-scene of the entity’s 
performance.  Equally, within the organisation it is each unit’s role to choose the 
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particular mise-en-scene to communicate with their individual stakeholders, even to 
determine who their stakeholders are. 
• Social power: This is more than the resources used to produce symbols and meanings for 
others to consume.  Social power is the knowledge, access and capacities to “project 
interpretations of [the] performance” (Alexander, 2011, p. 84).  For example, when a 
government department issues a press release, physical resources (e.g. computers, 
documents) are combined with knowledge of the topic to produce the press release – i.e. 
they comprise the ‘means of symbolic production’.  However, it is the ‘social power’ 
that arises from the knowledge and connections of the public servants that ensures the 
press release is published as intended (or fails to do so). 
• Audience: This is the essential element of Alexander’s theory.  As Alexander (2011, p. 
84) explains, “all of the above [bullet points] become significant only insofar as they 
allow or prevent meaning from being successfully projected to an audience”.  Successful 
performances depend on convincing audiences.  This entails more than knowing what 
interests an audience or what motivates them.  It is the process of achieving their 
psychological identification with the validity of the performance.  General acceptance, 
and sometimes support, by the audience will unify the audience not only with each other, 
but also with the actors involved.  This is where change (and energy to overcome 
instrumental and institutional barriers) occurs. 
 
Although Alexander’s theory provides significant potential for wide ranging research on public 
sector performance, this paper focuses on highlighting the usefulness of Alexander’s theory in 
two specific ways.  The first is to show that Alexander’s way of conceptualising performance is 
present, but overlooked, in practitioners’ existing understandings of performance.  Research on 
these overlooked notions will result in new insights.  Second, using this (re)conceptualisation of 
performance provides the opportunity for future research to fully explore “what is really going 
on in the public sector” (van Helden, 2005, p. 114). 
  
We now turn to outlining the methodology and method for the empirical research we draw on to 
illustrate the insights Alexander’s (2003, 2006, 2011) theory of performance gives to PMS 
research.               
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
 
The empirical evidence drawn on in this paper comes from three case studies that are 
underpinned by interpretive and constructionist research perspectives. The methodological 
foundations and methods for this research are outlined below. 
 
Research methodology 
Interpretative and constructionist perspectives (Hopwood and Miller, 1994) inform the empirical 
research drawn on in this paper, because these perspectives recognise that performance is not a 
static end point but a process that is constantly being developed.  These perspectives create 
room to study the multiple, complex and sometimes conflicting objectives of the public sector. 
They acknowledge that social and material life “take[s] on shape and form[s] during processes” 
and that “reality is emergent and inherently unstable” (Boedker, 2010, p. 599).  This means the 
definition of performance is being re-thought every time public servants develop performance 
management systems or write up the accountability documents that record such systems, and 
every time their ‘performance’ is judged in the media, in Parliament, by the public and by those 
interacting with public services (see for example Modell, 2005). Further, we follow Lindbolm’s 
(1959) lead in highlighting that stakeholders (including Governments, public servants and the 
public) can agree that a policy is good, without agreeing what it is good for.  This discrepancy is 
made particularly visible in the process of developing and reporting on PMS, hence this is the 
place where public servants need to ‘work out’ these tensions.  Taking an interpretative 
approach recognises the (re)construction of understandings in the unstable and emergent 
socially-created world.  Consequently, our ontological position recognises the performative 
nature of reality and its construction by individuals (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 19).  This means 
we do not seek to prove a causal relationship between performance conceptions and outcome 
achievement.  Instead, we adopt Agar’s view that “if people define a situation as real, it will be 
real in its consequences” (2010, p. 291).  This perspective also provides the opportunity to 
unpack how public servants (collectively) manage the discrepancies and instabilities that exist 
within the contexts of both organisational performance and their concept of serving the ‘public 
good’.    
 
Case study method 
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Three case study entities were used to gather empirical evidence on PMS via the interpretive 
lens of Alexander’s (2003, 2006, 2011) theory of performance. The case study organisations 
were core central government departments, an area of government which has only occasionally 
formed the focus of public sector research in the accounting journals reviewed for this paper.3  
Following Broadbent, Gallop and Laughlin (2010), we argue that core central government 
departments are those most likely to experience the discrepancies, instabilities and complexities 
that make market-focused notions of organisational performance (and related PMS) difficult to 
implement.  This is because, as Broadbent, Gallop and Laughlin (2010, p. 507) highlight, 
Governments “develop ... societal systems of regulation” that “steer” society in a desired 
direction.   In this sense, the performance of a government department is related to its ability to 
steer both the entities within its monitoring mandate (other government departments, schools, 
hospitals, police forces, etc.) and the citizenry of the jurisdiction.  Hence, assessing the 
performance of core central government departments entails a role – and implications – for 
society and democracy (c.f. Christensen and Skaebaek, 2007), which makes performance 
management especially complex and challenging in this context. 
 
In New Zealand, the entities mostly likely to be “steering” societal systems of regulation, rather 
than delivering services directly to the public, are central government departments.  While some 
government departments do have (transactional) service delivery units, the three departments in 
this study were chosen because they have predominately indirect ways to influence public 
services, focusing on steering New Zealand in a particular direction.  That is, the function of 
these entities is to: provide policy advice; review and administer legislation; and take a role in 
monitoring other government departments and/or other parts of the public sector/community.  
This means, in contrast to research where “Government” is a “black-boxed” (Skaebaek and 
Tryggestad, 2010, p. 122) external stakeholder with coercive powers, here these departments are 
the ones that provide advice on, and give effect to, government systems, which result in the 
coercive power usually seen as a ‘black box’.  As a result, these departments ‘steer’ the ways in 
which other entities will be involved with the State, the funding arrangements of the sector, the 
relationships between entities and citizens, and the interactions these entities have with 
executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government in a particular sector.   The three 
                                                   
3
 The process used to select journals for the literature review was outlined in footnote 1. 
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case studies drawn on in this paper focus on how public servants employed in these departments 
conceptualise performance within this context.  Although the empirical material is drawn from 
these government departments, this is not to say the findings are applicable only to them.  
Rather, because the service delivery functions do not dominate performance reporting, it 
provides a clearer example in which to see multiple conceptions of performance operate. 
 
Central government departments are also interesting case studies because the managers and staff 
are unlikely to be dominated by a particular professional group.  ‘Steering’ society is not the 
purview of any particular profession.  As a result, while it has been argued that policy analysts 
should form a professional group (Radin, 2000), this has yet to take hold in New Zealand.  For 
example, the backgrounds of the interviewees in this study included undergraduate and masters’ 
degrees ranging across social science, law, accounting, management, human resources, strategic 
studies, molecular biology, physics, linguistics, arts and humanities, public administration, 
politics and international relations.  This diversity of background does not lend itself to a 
profession versus managerialism conflict, as is typically seen in existing research (Skaebaek and 
Thorbjornsen, 2007; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Chang, 2006 & 2009).  Rather, policy analysts 
in central government departments are usually selected for their general problem solving skills.  
As one interviewee put it, “I recruit for ability to think, to solve problems. And, given our 
current fiscal constraints, people have to be creative enough to re-think how we do, uhh, 
everything!”  This means that technical skills, such as performance management approaches 
based on managerial philosophies or some other kind of technical/professional knowledge, can 
be acquired later.  As a result, policy analysts are usually simultaneously exposed to competing 
institutional logics regarding performance (Rautiainen and Jarvenpaa, 2012), rather than being 
acculturated into one particular logic and then introduced to others as competitors or 
complements.  This presents a different environment to the majority of performance 
management research to date, where a professional group, with its own standards of quality and 
its own technical training, is ‘coerced’ into, or voluntarily ‘mimics’, imposed PMS standards 
and expectations (e.g., Skaebaek and Thorbjornsen, 2007; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Chang, 
2009). Government departments offer an interesting and novel context for PMS research, 
therefore. 
 
Data collection via interviews 
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The data for this research comes primarily from interviews with New Zealand public servants, 
conducted between March 2012 and January 2013.  A review of public sector accountability 
documents and internal performance-related documents was also used to triangulate findings 
from interviews, as well as opportunistic observations, on site, at the three case entities. 
 
One author interviewed the Chief Executives from three4 government departments and, with 
their consent, then interviewed up to ten senior managers and experts in PMS within each entity 
and from other monitoring agencies associated with the entities, such as the Treasury. These 
people were identified using snowballing techniques (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 256).  Each 
interviewee was asked, (among other things), who they worked closely with on PMS.  This 
snowballing technique was used to ensure the participation of all those involved in PMS, 
whether or not their job descriptions specifically included PMS roles. 
  
In total, thirty interviews were conducted.  The number of interviews and case studies was 
determined by the point at which no new definitions or perceptions of ‘performance’ were being 
raised (Mills, Durepos and Wiebe, 2010, p. 928). The thirty interviewees represented 
approximately 15% of tier 2 managers across all New Zealand central government departments, 
as well as several performance experts. Furthermore, focusing on just three central government 
departments, with wide-ranging but indirect powers across the public service, allowed an in-
depth penetration into these entities that ranged from interviews with the Chief Executive down 
to fourth tier PMS experts, to opportunistic discussions with junior staff and other public 
servants working in similar areas.  The formal interviews were semi-structured in nature and 
lasted 30-90 minutes.  Interviewees were asked to describe their understanding of 
(organisational) performance and their role in it, as well as what they saw as the implications for 
managing organisational performance in government departments. The interviews were tape 
recorded (subject to the permission of participants) and later transcribed. Where tape-recording 
was not possible, hand written notes were taken during the interview. 
 
The credibility and neutrality of the data collected were enhanced via “active listening” while 
being cognisant of the purpose of the research (Silverman, 2006, p. 110).  Recognising that all 
                                                   
4
 In total, there are twenty-nine central government department Chief Executives in New Zealand (State 
Sector Act 1988). 
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interviews are interactional and retrospective and thereby impact on the trajectory of the 
information gathered (Silverman, 2006; Denzin, 1970; Rapley, 2004), structure was provided by 
advising later interviewees of the definitions that earlier interviewees used and then iteratively 
seeking the earlier interviewees’ views on emerging new definitions.  This built a rich picture of 
performance conceptualisation in the core government department case entities.  This picture 
included definitions of performance as well as how people’s perceptions, feelings and 
experiences impacted on those definitions.   
 
One potential drawback of the interview method is the social desirability phenomena (Rosenthal, 
2004, p. 53). Some participants may feel the need to represent their department as if it entirely 
conforms to monitoring agency  guidance on best practice.  Since the interviewer was known to 
many interviewees from her prior positions in organisational performance assessment units 
within monitoring agencies (also known as central agencies) such as the New Zealand Treasury, 
State Services Commission and the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), trust needed to be 
established quickly.  Confidentiality was assured so that interviewees could feel comfortable 
discussing all aspects of their entity’s performance, whether or not it complied with guidance.  
Consequently, no information is given about the sectors the case entities are in because the small 
number of government departments in each sector means they could be identified.  Chief 
Executives and other senior managers are identified here by generic titles only.  In addition, 
interviewed staff who had considerable influence on PMS (in the eyes of other interviewees) 
have been identified as either senior performance experts or performance experts.  The term 
‘senior’ denotes either a direct report relationship with the Chief Executive or a performance 
specialist from a monitoring agency, such as the New Zealand Treasury or State Services 
Commission.  ‘Performance experts’ were the fourth tier staff who often undertook the 
production work associated with PMS.  This included maintenance of systems, collection of data, 
the writing of internal reports and external accountability documents, as well as training other 
staff on the PMS.   
 
Data Analysis 
One challenge with the free-ranging nature of semi-structured interviews is the amount and 
complexity of the data collected.  This is a strength of research that does not start out with a 
hypothesis to test, as it “seeks out unexpected data and creates new concepts to explain them” 
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(Agar, 2010, p. 289).  However, the data needs to be selected and prioritised.  This was done by 
organising the data into themes, and then focusing on those themes that are not well traversed in 
the literature.  Themes that reinforced existing well-researched areas included (for example): 
that Ministers are prioritised over other stakeholders (Chang, 2009) and that tight coupling of 
individual rewards and sanctions with PMS leads to dysfunctional effects (ter Bogt and Scapens, 
2012).  Focusing on the anomalous themes that are not well explored in the literature will give 
the research a criticality that is not about generalisable success or failure, but about how PMS 
are being used in practice.  This aspect of implementation is often lost in the positivistic 
approaches adopted in many previous studies of performance management (Mayston, 1985).  At 
the same time, Alexander’s theory is a useful tool for remembering that “the actor’s point of 
view” does not become the “explanation” (Silverman, 1997, p. 199).  Instead this research seeks 
to understand not only “the cultural forms through which ‘truths’ are accomplished” (Silverman, 
1993, p. 208), but also which actions and effects stabilise into performance management 
practices.   
 
While the knowledge produced from the three case studies will be local (to a degree), it will also 
be focused on the “generative mechanisms of human interaction” (Porter, 1993, cited in May, 
1997), which are often generalisable to theory regardless of their location.  Alexander’s theory 
helps make the findings from these case study sites generalisable to other public sector contexts.  
 
Outline of how the themes were derived  
We selected an interpretive thematic analysis sensitive to the lens of Alexander’s performance 
theory (Alexander, 2006).  Furthermore, Silverman cautions against treating information from 
respondents as only ‘fact’, which is what objective coding tends to assume, when their answers 
also distil a situated ‘narrative’ (Silverman, 1993, p. 100).  As a consequence, this analysis does 
not seek to determine a single, ‘best’ way of implementing performance management initiatives.  
Instead, it recognises each response as a positional statement.  Treating these responses as fact, 
even as perceived fact, is to indicate that they supply information about causes, when they may 
only supply information about symptoms (Bardach, 2000, p. 18).   
 
Instead of making a choice between fact and narrative during the thematic coding of interviews, 
we sought to make visible some of the meaning-making categories that individuals use when 
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defining the effects of performance management systems in their organisation.  Given the semi-
structured and guided nature of the interviews, the gathered data did not lend itself to discourse 
or narrative analysis.  Therefore, each response was reduced to a key idea (or more than one 
idea) and each idea was categorised.  The purpose of the categorisations was to reveal the ways 
in which people think about performance management in government departments and to see 
whether or not Alexander’s theory of performance added value to understanding these 
perspectives. The development of categories was completed while being sensitive to Llewellyn 
and Northcott’s (2007, p. 194) reminder to be aware of the “singular case”, whereby an 
insightful comment is as significant as a view held by the majority. Consequently, although 
frequency counts have been used to inform the analysis, the focus was on identifying categories 
that are already explored in the literature and – more importantly - those that are not, to better 
inform PMS research and implementation.   
 
Data analysis procedures 
The first step was to clean the data.  The data was then coded via “open coding” as described by 
Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 586).  Some codes were taken directly from the responses, including 
using commonly repeated phrases as codes.  For example, “linear production models” was a 
phrase often used to describe the way performance needed to be conceptualised in order for the 
PMS to function as intended.  This was coded as the first conceptualisation of performance, the 
production-based model (Van Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2010, p. 17-22).  In other cases, 
codes were developed from the perceived key idea behind the statement.  For example, if an 
interviewee discussed multiple audiences, regardless of whether they used the word ‘audience’, 
stakeholders, or named individual audiences (such as Ministers, government departments or the 
public), these statements were all coded as being about the multiplicity of audiences.  Coding 
began as soon as the first interview was complete.  This meant coding remained iterative as new 
interviews shifted the potential for combining or separating codes.  Once this coding was 
complete, codes were collapsed into emergent categories based on patterns and commonalities 
in the data.  These categories were ‘family resemblance’ categories rather than a collection of 
identical responses. Finally, anomalous cases were considered.  This included both data that did 
not fit within a category and data where the categorisation appeared to distort the key idea.  In 
this way, coding and categorisation was an iterative process of checking that the analysis not 
only made sense, but was also being informed by Alexander’s performance theory.  The purpose 
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was not to define the categories that can be generalised to all performance management systems, 
but rather to give ideas for expanding theory beyond its existing parameters to contribute toward 
(re)conceptualising performance in the public sector.  Perhaps this may assist in ‘reinventing’ 
the understandings of how performance is accomplished based on public sector experiences 
(Pallot, 1999). 
 
Limitations 
The limitation of analysing response data, as Silverman (1993, p. 98) cautions, is that any 
communication will be fraught and contain multiple potential meanings and motives.  While we 
do not take his extreme option - that is, a study of the interaction itself, not its transference of 
meaning - we do note the limitations of the meanings imputed to this data.  Consequently, we 
supplemented initial interviews with secondary interviews where the interviewer discussed 
previous findings, both from specific interviewees and more general points raised.  This led to 
iterative development of the findings discussed next.   
 
 
HOW DOES ALEXANDER’S THEORY SHED LIGHT ON PUBLIC SERVANTS’ 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF PERFORMANCE AND HOW THEY MANAGE IT? 
 
To recap, Alexander’s theoretical framework identifies the elements of (any) performance to 
trace where and how actors and audience become “fused” (Alexander, 2011, p. 38). This 
‘fusing’ occurs when the actors extend their cultural view to their audience and the audience 
give their psychological identification with the performance, thus unifying audience and actors 
in a common sense of performance achievement.  This perspective recognises the public sector 
experience, where performance information is already (and always) used by audiences to make 
judgements about public sector performance.  So, while (for example) Bogt and Scapens (2012) 
might be concerned at the stress caused by the use of performance information about individual 
university lecturers, Alexander’s (2006) theory helps to highlight that information is already, 
always used to judge organisational performance, so the key to a successful ‘academic 
performance’ lies in unifying the audience in its performance expectations.  That is, that an 
academic department has not ‘performed’ until it has convinced its audience of its “prescriptive 
and descriptive validity” (Alexander, 2006, p. 29).  Alexander’s perspective also gives 
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theoretical support to de Bruijn and van Helden’s (2006) claim that co-creation of PMS will be 
more successful.  However, most studies of PMS have not yet considered what it takes to 
persuade audiences of an entity’s performance when co-creation is not possible.  While de Brujn 
and van Helden (2006, p. 414) note that staff and managers “accepted [the PMS] as fair 
indications of relative performance”, they attribute this mainly to co-creation of the indicators.  
So to re-state de Brujn and van Helden’s (2006)  point using Alexander’s language, the 
management team as actors created a “psychological identification” and “cultural extension” 
between staff and the indicators, “fusing” their notions of performance (Alexander, 2006, p. 77).  
Yet, de Brujn and van Helden (2006) do not investigate how a department could do this, when it 
cannot co-create its indicators with all of its external stakeholders at one time.  
 
In our study, when asked about organisational performance and how entities knew they were 
performing, most interviewees did not discuss the elements of performance that appeared in our 
literature review - such as output measures, probity, equity, or even effectiveness at the 
individual level - until they were probed about these concepts.  Instead, they discussed their 
work with audiences of performance information, and the relationship between types of 
performance information and the audiences that consumed them. 
 
For example, interviewees talked about the multiplicity of understandings of “good 
performance”.  One Deputy Chief Executive felt she was  
“repackaging [performance information] in a way that whoever is receiving it is 
going to think that that’s a great piece of work – if it is a great piece of work  .... At 
first I thought I was a little bit spin-doctoring and now I think it’s just actually 
thinking about the value that people are looking for, different levels or different types 
of value that people are looking for in the work that we do ... so it’s juggling”. 
 
Applying Alexander’s theory suggests this deputy Chief Executive is doing more than 
“repackaging” information for each audience.  Alexander’s theory shows that public servants 
who succeed in ‘performing’ not only re-frame information as part of their organisational 
performance and accountabilities, but also make the frame “flesh and blood” for the audience.  
Machine-like completion of tasks and formal reporting of such performance information can 
never be enough to persuade audiences to participate in the social changes that public service 
departments seek.   
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Another Chief Executive elaborated on this point by discussing the need to get “everyone on 
board”.  He talked about a multi-year process he had gone through as the new Chief Executive, 
to  “educate” stakeholders and ask for trust and time to demonstrate how his new ideas “would 
make a difference” to citizens.  He noted that after a few years of working with several 
stakeholders simultaneously so that each heard the others’ perspectives and needs, his new 
announcements were no longer met with immediate protest.  In his opinion, a successful 
performance meant being offered trust by executive Government and citizens to try new things.  
He knew he was trusted when he was given time to experiment.  He noted, for example, that 
immediately after his appointment stakeholders from executive government and the community 
immediately complained when he proposed new policies or programmes.  However, now, some 
years after his initial appointment, stakeholders did not complain immediately, but rather gave 
him time to implement his ideas and show results before they commented.  He also noted they 
commented less (negatively) and that now, from time to time, he received accolades from some 
previously harsh critics.  Through Alexander’s theoretical lens, the success of this performance 
lay in unifying the belief of the public servants and their key audiences that the department was 
enacting its essence and was in the ‘process of becoming’ what the public wanted.  This 
reinforces Arnaboldi and Palmero’s (2011, p. 6) idea of being compelled to always “ do better 
next time” (italics not in the original).  However, using Alexander’s theory brings research a 
step closer to understanding what “better” means.  In Alexander’s terms, it means that the 
department needs to be seen to be enacting its essence and becoming what people expect.  To 
achieve this requires as much effort in unifying expectations as it does on designing and 
executing the management or measurement system. 
 
Another example of how this unification around performance information might be achieved 
can be seen in an example several interviewees (at senior manager and analyst level) gave of 
successful performance through a “story” they had heard from other public servants (Gabriel, 
2004).  We repeat this “story” here because it was used by more than one interviewee to 
understand, and to teach others, how the ‘job’ of performance management is done.  
Furthermore, we have identified the department to which this story is attached only because it 
does not identify the interviewees, since those who told the story had not worked for this entity.  
This story is significant because it is only “true” in the sense of the reality/rhetoric split, i.e. as 
an example of Agar’s (2010) perspective that when people believe something is real, they act on 
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it as if it is real, regardless of whether it was actually ‘true’ or proof can be found that this event 
happened.  Our interviewees believed this story to be real and used it to guide how they thought 
about managing organisational performance.   
 
According to this story, a former Chief Executive of the Child Youth and Family Service 
(CYFS)5 received a negative evaluation of one of the group homes this government department 
ran for troubled young people.  In response he chose to open the home, and others like it, to the 
press.  He took a group of journalists to the home and allowed them the opportunity to meet staff 
and young people.  He showed them the complexities of the young peoples’ needs and the 
attempts to make the home run efficiently while treating the young people in a therapeutic rather 
than prison-like way.  In this way, the “director” (the CE) controlled the particular script, mis-
en-scene and “performance”.  He shared with the audience the challenges of the task and made 
both staff and young people “flesh and blood”.  He projected a different set of emotions into the 
script than would have been the case had he issued an impersonal press release.  In contrast to 
the common reporting of CYFS ‘failures’ and wasting of public money, this story was reported 
in a less inflammatory way and contained more emotions and information that actually related to 
living and working in group homes.  The space created by this more balanced view of the 
situation allowed the CE (and no doubt his/her staff) to spend more time working on improving 
the situation of the group home.   
 
This management of ‘performance’ is different from that usually associated with monitoring 
budget variances, financial targets, or even non-financial information (see for example: Thomas, 
2006; Lee, 2008).  Applying Alexander’s (2006) theory emphasises that making performance 
information “flesh and blood” is not a replacement for the review of the group home, or for the 
media’s role in making CYFS accountable. This theoretical approach makes it clear that 
performance management does not stop with the production of financial and non-financial 
information or the consideration of such data in decision making.  ‘Performance’ management - 
if it is to be successful - lies in transforming the audience(s) as well.   
 
                                                   
5
 This government department no longer exists.  CYFS activities now fall within the Ministry of Social 
Development, which also has functions in benefit distribution, youth development, senior citizens’ welfare and 
other social funding. 
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We have argued that by reconceptualising the idea of performance we centre it in the study.  
This opens up the possibility of changing research understandings of performance in 
government departments and shedding light on why some entities are seen as successful and 
others are not.  According to Alexander (2006), all entities face fragmented audiences.  However, 
some entities use their performances to persuade audiences of their validity, while others do not.  
Whether an entity is public or private is not what drives the success (or performance) of the 
entity; what matters is whether or not it can unify its audiences to participate in improvement 
actions.  What does differ between public and private sector contexts is what the entity needs to 
unify its audiences about, and what it wants them to do as a result of their psychological 
identification with the validity of the entity.  Alexander’s theory surfaces the interrelationships 
between these types of “flesh and blood” enactment. 
 
The second useful application of Alexander’s theory is to highlight the fluidity of performance 
and show that this fluidity should not be seen as suspicious.  The decoupling of ‘reality’ from 
rhetoric is not always associated with the advancement of ulterior (self-seeking) motives (Hood, 
1995).  In effect, Alexander’s theory highlights that fluidity is the essence of what allows 
fragmented external stakeholders to come to accept the descriptive and prescriptive intention 
and actions of public servants.  Without the performance resulting in a change to audiences’ 
perceptions, public sector departments will not have completed their ‘steering’ function in 
society.  Chang (2006 and 2009) and Samkin and Schneider (2010) suggest, in their respective 
case studies, that public entities undertake their ‘performances’ (to use Alexander’s 
terminology) in order to ensure their “survival”.  However, in the case studies for this research, 
this was not the only reason entities wanted to be seen to be performing.  Indeed, many 
interviewees explicitly wished to do “such a good job” (Performance Expert) in steering 
significant permanent changes in society that government intervention would no longer be 
required and their entities could be dis-established (source: interviews with several senior 
managers and one performance expert).  Rather than focusing on survival, the interviewees 
wanted to be seen to perform because this gave them space and trust to experiment and try new 
ways of “delivering benefits for citizens” (Chief Executive).  An example of this could be seen 
at one entity’s all-staff strategic planning day.  Even though some senior managers had noted in 
interviews that their organisation was “probably a necessary evil” (Chief Executive), the 
strategic planning day saw interns to senior managers trying to redesign the system so their 
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monitoring function was no longer required.  The purpose was to ensure that the entity was 
prioritising its resources in the most effective ways and ensuring it was not repeating tasks year 
after year if new technology, or other system changes, meant its function could be more 
efficiently delivered elsewhere.  One participant in the strategic planning day remarked: 
“Wouldn’t it be great if someone could write a computer programme to search for [a 
specific kind of data] in the information management system and then check it against 
compliance responsibilities.  Then we could be free to do the stuff where our brains are 
needed” (Analyst).   
 
To use Alexander’s terminology, this public servant wanted to free humans’ time and brains for 
tasks that required a social performance to be accepted, rather than applying them to what was, 
in his mind, a machine-like task. 
 
This striving on the part of public servants to reduce their functions, rather than “enrich 
themselves” (Hood, 1995, p. 93), goes to the heart of the shift that Hood identified when he 
coined the term new public management (NPM).  He noted the shift from a pre-NPM 
assumption of “ascetic zealots” towards “low trust”, “accountingized” models where any 
deviation from ‘objective’ reporting of accurate financial information was seen to be in the 
pursuit of personal gain (Hood, 1995, p. 94).   Alexander’s theory of performance provides an 
alternative view.  For some functions, machine-like performance is enough.  However, there are 
many other functions for which social performance is not necessarily suspicious or false, but 
critical for improvement to occur.  Without this kind of social performance to unify actor and 
audience expectations, performance cannot be seen to be successful and thus bring the change 
needed for “delivering benefits for citizens” (Chief Executive). 
 
Traditionally, PMS have been seen to provide value to public servants by integrating financial 
and non-financial information.  However, our findings suggest that, in government departments, 
this contribution is necessary but not sufficient to encourage public servants to take full 
advantage of the opportunities PMS provide and persevere in overcoming the barriers to PMS 
implementation.  Alexander’s focus on the need for actors and audience to develop shared 
beliefs highlights that performance is (and should be) something more than a market-based 
model that focuses on the exchange of goods and services.  The social persuasion inherent in 
successful social performance is as important to steering society as the factual content of a PMS. 
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CONCLUSION 
There have been calls in the literature to examine the public (Pollitt, 1986), subjective 
(Jeppesen, 2012) or multidimensional (Modell, 2009) aspects of public sector performance.  
Alexander’s theory provides an avenue for doing so, as illustrated here in relation to core 
government departments.  The key reason central government entities were chosen as case 
studies was that these are the entities that execute the frameworks of society that are selected 
by Governments in order to steer society (Broadbent, Gallop and Laughlin, 2010).  As the 
analysis of these cases suggests, Alexander’s theory provides three contributions to the 
literature on PMS in the context of core government departments.   
 
First, much PMS research focuses on formal systems, measurement, implementation, and/or 
behavioural incentives that PMS both shape and are shaped by.  However, when asked about 
performance and how to manage it, interviewees spent more time talking about management 
of performance in terms of unifying audience expectations.  Audiences might be ‘the public’ 
or they might be inside the public sector – central agencies, the Minister, or other government 
departments.  Regardless of who the audience is, Alexander’s theory emphasises that unifying 
that audience(s) is key to success because that unity results in collective action and energy to 
facilitate change.  In this sense, Alexander’s theory contextualises why our interviewees 
considered it so important (in the context of performance management) to discuss public 
engagement about what government departments can and cannot achieve, and what citizens 
do and do not want to be under government control (OAG, 2013).  This topic is usually 
outside traditional PMS studies, which focus on public sector performance as if it is only 
about the production of goods and/or the delivery of services, and only about the performance 
of the entity itself, not in conjunction with the persuasive power the department has on 
audiences.     
 
Alexander’s theory provides insights into this level of focus on the audience.  Interviewees 
did mention measurement, formal systems implementation, and/or reporting through 
accountability documents.  However, their discussion of documents (for example), could be 
likened to the usefulness of incidental props, or the systems that provide information for the 
production of symbolic meaning.  In contrast, Alexander highlights the centrality of the entire 
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performance, including making performance information “flesh and blood”.  He emphasises 
that it is necessary to persuade audiences of the organisation’s “descriptive and prescriptive 
validity” (Alexander, 2006, p. 29).  Alexander’s theory draws our attention to why the 
interviewees put such effort into unifying audiences – because without convincing them of 
more than the accuracy of quantified effectiveness information (as audit assurances and 
performance audit reports do), the performance would never be seen as authentic and hence 
the entity would never be seen to be performing.   
 
Second, Alexander’s theory makes visible what public servants constantly live with, i.e. the 
fact that their audiences judge their performance based on expectations and criteria that may 
bear little resemblance to officially stated goals.  Furthermore, audience judgements about the 
performance will be the barrier, or the energiser, for performance improvement.  ter Bogt and 
Scapens (2012) discuss the negative consequences of tightly coupling rewards and sanctions 
to individual PMS information.  At the organisational level, Alexander shows the inevitable 
use of publicly available information to judge public sector performance.  In this context, (as 
Lindblom [1959] notes) a group home for youths might be both a punishment and place of 
therapy; a department might enact a law that promotes human rights for residents over 
security for citizens (from certain perspectives).  Fundamental to entity success is how public 
servants make sense of these different expectations and unify audiences to agree that the 
entity is doing the right performance and doing it well.  Alexander’s theory draws attention to 
the need to orchestrate an entire social performance to achieve performance expectations.   
 
Third, as accounting research catches up to public sector performance in non-service 
delivering departments, this paper argues that more attention needs to be given to 
performance in relation to the steering media and mechanisms (such as laws, money and 
power) created and controlled by government departments (Broadbent, Gallop and Laughlin, 
2010).  If, as Kurunmaki and Miller (2006) imply, government is always “failing” and if 
performance is always a state of becoming (Butler, 1993), we need new models and new 
theories (like Alexander’s) to assist the public sector to meet this challenge.  The definition of 
performance, while taken for granted, is still fluid, as the diversity of its use in this paper 
exposes.  Currently, research overlooks how people make “flesh and blood” performances of 
performance management systems.  According to Alexander’s theory, this is more than the 
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practices of performance experts and senior managers, it is how the orchestrated performance 
persuades (or does not persuade) the audience.    Introducing Alexander’s theory specifically 
brings out the tension between reality and performance by side-stepping the debate as to when 
performance stops/starts being real, and recommends studying how public servants and their 
audiences construct an ongoing performance together.  This research suggests that better 
understandings of how public servants construct the reality of their performance in 
conjunction with diverse audiences will be critical to understanding PMS implementation and 
maintenance.  Alexander’s theory provides an opportunity to focus on the (re)construction of 
performance as a ‘process of becoming’ rather than the measurement of a static, task-
completion (machine-like) process.  Alexander’s theory makes visible how little public sector 
performance management accounting research knows about the role of PMS in unifying 
audiences and determining what public sector performance should be in order to ‘steer’ 
society in the desired direction.  These united audiences create the performance expectations, 
not a narrow conception of a good or service production in isolation from the societal changes 
that these goods and services might bring about.  We also suggest that herein lies the ‘public 
character’ on which Pollitt (1986) was seeking more focus.  Our interviewees felt that 
judgements of their (organisational) performance were as much about societal changes as they 
were about the efficiency of output delivery. Hence Alexander’s theory makes visible the 
struggles these public servants engage in to unify fragmented audiences through making 
performance “flesh and blood”.   
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